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COMMENT

Defining an "Innocent Owner" Under 21
U.S.C. § 881: The Eleventh Circuit's Use of
the Calero-Toledo Dicta

A major new weapon in combatting the drug trade is the civil forfeiture
of property that was the instrument or proceeds of the drug trade.1 Civil
forfeiture is an in rem action against the seized property itself and is independent of any criminal proceeding that may be directed at the owner
of the property.2 Because civil (in rem) forfeitures rely on the legal fiction
that the property itself is guilty s the government need not indict or convict the property owner.'
Because of the nature of a civil forfeiture, innocent owners and third
parties such as spouses and commercial lenders who have legitimate ownership interests in forfeited property may find themselves casualties in
1. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988). Criminal forfeiture of property is authorized by 21 U.S.C.

§ 853 (1988).
2. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-89 (1974); U.S. Dept.
Of Justice, Drug Agents' Guide to Forfeiture of Assets (1987 revision), 3-9 (1987) [hereinafter Drug Agents' Guide].
3. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931); U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, VOL. 1, AssET FORFEITURE: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 3 (1988) [hereinafter
ASSET FORFEITURE].

4. See Drug Agents' Guide, supra note 2, at 30.
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the war against drugs.' Historically, the innocence of the property owner
was no defense to civil forfeiture actions.6 Likewise, the civil drug forfeiture statute as originally enacted contained only limited statutory protection for innocent owners. 7 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.,' the Supreme Court, however, recognized that "innocent owners"
may have some constitutional protection from civil forfeiture.' In amendments to 21 U.S.C. § 881 ("section 881") after the decision in Calero-

Toledo, Congress, while increasing the scope of property forfeitable, combined this increase in scope with additional statutory "innocent owner"
defenses to forfeiture.'0
This comment will examine the civil forfeiture statute's "innocent
owner" provisions and what constitutes "innocence" within the meaning
of those provisions. While decisions from all federal courts will be discussed, this comment focuses on the state of the law in the Eleventh Circuit. Part One will present a brief history of the civil forfeiture statute,
the decision in Calero:Toledo, and section 881's "innocent owner" statutory defenses. Part Two will examine each statutory innocent owner provision, how various courts have interpreted them, and subject those interpretations to a critical analysis to determine the more reasoned approach.

5. For a general discussion of the effects of forfeiture statutes on "innocent lenders" see
Whitney Adams, The Government's Forfeiture Power: An Unreasonable Threat to Bona
Fide Lenders, 56 BNA's Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 16 at.750 (April 22, 1991).
Lienholders and mortgagees are now recogni'zed as."owners" for purposes of asserting the
innocent owner defense. See United States v. One Urban Lot Located at 1 St. A-i,
Valpariso, Bayamon, P.R., 865 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Metmor Fin. Inc., 819
F.2d 446, 448 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. One Piece of Real Estate, Described in Part
as: 1314 Whiterock & Improvements, San Antonio, Bexar County, Tex., 571 F. Supp. 723,
725 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
6. For a discussion of the historical treatment of "innocent owners" in civil forfeiture
actions see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Ldasing' Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-686 (1974).
7.' See The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at.21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988)). See infra
text accompanying notes 18-20 for a discussion of the limited protection provided by § 881
as originally enacted.
8.

416 U.S. 663 (1974).

9.

Id. at 689. See infra text accompanying: notes 21-29 for a discussion of the case.

10. The innocent owner defenses are codified,at 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (7) (1988). In
addition, in 1988 Congress added 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) which provides "innocent owner"
protection similar to that contained in subsections (a)(6) and (7). For a discussion of the
expansion of statutory innocent owner protection see Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering
the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug
Cases, 76 VA. L. REv. 165, 167-71 (1990).
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I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY "INNOCENT OWNER" DEFENSES

A.

The Original Civil Drug Forfeiture Statute

The use of civil (in rem) forfeiture in combatting the war on drugs began in 1970 when Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act ("Drug Act")." Its purpose was to fight drug
abuse by providing a mix of rehabilitation, prevention, and more effective
law enforcement measures. 12 The Drug Act's original civil forfeiture provisions authorized forfeiture of (1) all controlled substances, (2) raw
materials used in the manufacture or distribution of controlled substances, (3) containers for controlled substances, (4) conveyances or vehicles used in connection with controlled substances, and (5) any records
associated with such activities.1 s For the property to be subject to forfeiture, the government had only to show probable cause to believe the
property was violative of the statutory provisions.14 Once the government
established probable cause, the burden then shifted to the claimant 5 to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was not
subject to forfeiture.16 A claimant could meet this burden by either rebutting the government's evidence establishing probable cause or by showing
that he was an "innocent owner.""
The original statute protected innocent owners of conveyances subject
to forfeiture only if the vehicle had been stolen and was no longer in their
possession at the time the illegal activity occurred.' A second "innocent
11. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). Congress also passed in personam forfeiture
statutes that same year. See the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
1961-64, 84 Stat. 922, 941-44 (1970), and Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1265 (1970).
12. See H.R. 191-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Seass. 1-10 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4566-4574.
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1)-(5) (1988).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (1988). The standard definition of probable cause is a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere
suspicion." United States v. A Single Family Residence and Real Property Located at 900
Rio Vista Blvd., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., 803 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. $364,960,000, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981)).
15. Any person alleging an interest in property subject to forfeiture is designated as a
claimant. See Edith A. Landman & John Hieronymus, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 70 MIcH. B.J. 174, 179 (1991).
16. See, e.g., United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave.
North, Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla., 933 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir. 1991).
17. See Lalit K. Loomba, Note, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 FORDHAM L. Rav. 471, 475
(1989) (discussing the mechanics of civil forfeiture proceedings).
18. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(B) (1988). This provision offered only a limited protection
to "innocent owners" because even if an owner lacked any knowledge of the vehicle's illegal
use, forfeiture would still occur if the illegally used vehicle had been lawfully obtained from
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owner" provision protected common carriers by denying forfeiture of

their vehicles if they could establish that they were not consenting parties
or privy to the violation giving rise to forfeiture."' Innocent owners who
did not fall into these categories were unprotected by the statute. For

these owners, the only protection available was by way of certain remission and mitigation procedures provided under 19 U.S.C. § 1618.20 Thus,

although the original section 881 offered some protection to "innocent
owners," it did not provide total coverage.
B. The Calero-Toledo Decision
Prior to any further Congressional expansion of either civil forfeiture or

"innocent owner" protection, the Supreme Court recognized that certain
owners may be entitled to constitutional protection from forfeiture of
their property.21 In Calero-Toledo,22 a lessor's yacht was seized under a

Puerto Rican statute similar to section 881 when police found marijuana
on board."' The lessor was neither involved in nor had any knowledge of
the lessee's illegal act.' The Court held that forfeiture statutes are not
rendered unconstitutional merely because of their applicability to the
property interests of innocents." Like other forfeiture statutes, the Puerto Rican statute served both preventive and deterrent purposes suffi-

cient to withstand constitutional challenge even though the statute lacked
any "innocent owner" defense. 6
Despite the fact that the "innocence of the owner of property subject to
forfeiture ha[d] almost uniformly been rejected as a defense, '27 the Court,

in dicta, noted that an owner may be entitled to a constitutional defense
if he "proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
the owner. See United States v. One 1982 Datsun 200SX, 627 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Pa. 1985),
afJ'd mem., 782 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1978 Chrysler Le Baron
Station Wagon, 648 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1988).
20. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 n.27 (1974). The
granting of remission or mitigation is deemed equivalent to an "executive pardon." Drug
Agents' Guide, supra note 2, at 214-15. See also 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.7 (1991) and 21 C.F.R.
§§ 1316.71-1316.81 (1991) for the Drug Enforcement Administration and Department of
Justice remission and mitigation procedures.
21. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 665, 686-87 n.25.
24. Id. at 664.
25. Id. at 680.
26. Id. at 686-87. The court also noted that as applied to innocent secured lenders, lessors, and bailors, forfeiture statutes may have a "desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property." Id. at 688.
27. Id. at 683.
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wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."' The lessor of
the yacht, however, was not an "innocent owner" entitled to such protection. Even though the lessor was uninvolved in and unaware of the illegal
activity, it failed to offer any proof that it had done "all that it reasonably
could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use."' 9 Some courts
have incorporated this dicta into the statutory innocent owner defenses. s°
C. Expansion of Statutory Innocent Owner Defenses
In 1978, in recognition that the nation was losing the war on drugs despite the forfeiture laws,31 Congress added section 881(a)(6) to permit forfeiture of the proceeds of illegal drug transactions8 2 Congress hoped that
the new provision would remove
the motive for the illegal drug trade by
3
eliminating the profit from it.1

At the same time, Congress, in addition to stiffening the civil forfeiture
provision, also expanded the protection offered "innocent owners. ' 34 The
new statutory provision stated that "no property shall be forfeited under
this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been' 'scommitted or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 3
The 1978 amendments failed, however, to achieve the results in the
drug war that Congress had hoped for s3 and in 1984 Congress again
amended section 881.3" According to the General Accounting Office, the
forfeiture statutes had not been aggressively used by federal law enforcement agencies, partially because of the statutory limitations and ambigui28. Id. at 689.
29. Id. at 690.
30. See infra notes 85-122 and accompanying text.
31. See 124 Cong. Rec. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn).
32. Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a)(1), 92 Stat. 3777 (1978). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988)
provides that the following will be subject to forfeiture:
[A]ll moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished
or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance
in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter ....
33. See 124 Cong. Rec. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn); 124 Cong. Rec.
23,056 (1978) (statement of Sen. Culver).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988). For a discussion of the statutory innocent owner protection then offered by section 881 see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.

35. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).
36. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess. 191-97 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374-80.
37. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-23, 98 Stat. 2040-57 (1984).
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ties present in the forfeiture laws. 8 At that time, the civil forfeiture statute provided no mechanism for the forfeiture of real property even
though it was used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction.3 ' To remedy
the situation, Congress enacted section 881(a)(7), which authorized forfeiture of any real property used or intended to be used in connection with a
felony narcotics violation.40
As with the 1978 amendment, Congress also added an "innocent
owner" counterpart to its expansion of the forfeiture statute.4'1 The provision's language is identical to the "innocent owner" defense contained in
section 881(a)(6)'s "proceeds" provision.4
While the 1978 and 1984 amendments to the original civil forfeiture
statute had dual goals of expanding the range of forfeiture and increasing
protection for innocent owners, Congress in 1988 decided to correct the
deficiency in the original "innocent owner" defense to the forfeiture of
vehicles and conveyances' 8 by adding one final statutory defense for "in-

38. See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 36, at 191-92.
39. S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 36, at 195 stated:
Under current law, if a person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses
equipment to manufacture dangerous drugs, his use of the property renders it
subject to civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his house as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is
no provision to subject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was
indispensable to the commission of a major drug offense ....
However, two court decisions had held real property forfeitable under section 881(a)(6) if
it was traceable to the proceeds of an illegal drug transaction. See United States v. 8584 Old
Brownsville Rd., 736 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Route 3, 568 F.
Supp. 434, 436 (W.D. Ark. 1983).
Likewise, real property was then forfeitable under the criminal RICO and CCE statutes.
See S. Rep. No. 225, supra note 36, at 193-95.
40. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984). 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) provides
that the following will be subject to forfeiture:
All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment ....
At this time, Congress also enacted section 881(h) which codified the "relation back" doctrine. Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 306, 98 Stat. 2050 (1984). The relation back doctrine fixes title to
forfeitable property in the government at the time the illegal act giving rise to forfeiture
occurred. This has caused immense problems for subsequent bona fide purchasers of forfeitable property.-For a thorough treatment of the subject see Jankowski, supra note 10, at 17188.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
42. See supra text accompanying note 35.
43. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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nocent owners."44 In creating this statutory defense, Congress departed
from the language it had used with the proceeds and real property provisions. Instead, section 881(a)(4)(C) protected a claimant's vehicle from
forfeiture only if the claimant established that the violation giving rise to
forfeiture was "committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or
4
willful blindness of the owner.'

Thus, under the current civil forfeiture statute owners possess three
main statutory defenses to forfeiture. 6 Since these provisions cover the
forfeiture of vehicles, proceeds, and real property, items in which those
owners who are truly innocent are most likely to have an interest, there
would seem to be little need for application of the Calero-Toledo dicta.
Nevertheless, many courts have considered whether Calero-Toledo should
be incorporated into these provisions. The following section will discuss
how courts, especially in the Eleventh Circuit, have defined "innocence"
in light of the language of each of the various statutory defenses and the
Supreme Court's dicta in Calero-Toledo.
II. THE JUDICIAL DEFINITION OF INNOCENCE IN LIGHT OF THE STATUTE
A.

21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C)

The main innocent owner defense to the vehicle-conveyance portion of
the civil forfeiture statute, section 881(a)(4)(C), disallows forfeiture if the
owner can prove that the illegal act giving rise to forfeiture occurred
"without [his] knowledge, consent or willful blindness.' 7 The authoritative case in the Eleventh Circuit interpreting this statutory provision is
United States v. One 1980 Betram 58' Motor Yacht, Known as the MIV
48

Mologa.

The court in One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht did not directly discuss the meaning of the phrase "without knowledge, consent or willful
blindness" found in section 881(a)(4)(C). Instead, it merely cited that section as controlling on the status of the claimant as an innocent owner,'49
and then held that the claimant must meet the literal requirements of
44.

Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 § 6075 (1988)

(codified at 21 U.S.C.

§ 881(a)(4)(C) .(1988)).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988).
46. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6), (a)(7) (1988).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C). See supra text accompanying notes 18 and 19 for a discussion of the other two "innocent owner" defenses to the forfeiture of conveyances and
vehicles.
48. 876 F.2d 884 (11th Cir. 1989).
49. Id. at 887.
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Calero-Toledo to prevail on a defense of innocent ownership.50 Perhaps
confusedly, the court cited as authority a decision handed down prior to
the enactment of the new statutory innocent owner provision. 1 The failure to discuss the import of this language is surprising because this case
was the court of appeal's first opportunity to interpret the newly enacted
statutory innocent owner provision of section 881(a)(4), and because the
court was setting precedent with its ruling. The court's failure to consider
the effects of the new provision on the status of those claiming to be "innocent owners" is indicative of the Eleventh Circuit's present hard line
approach to those even peripherally connected to drug dealing. 2
At least one court outside the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the innocent owner provision of section 881(a)(4)(C) by defining "willful blindness" in light of its meaning in the criminal context. 5 The. court cited a
jury instruction that willful blindness is an "[e]lement of knowledge
[which] may be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant
deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to
him."" Willful blindness has also been deemed present when a person
"has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further
inquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance.""5
Because willful blindness requires a "high probability" of awareness of
the truth, 56 the use of that term in section 881(a)(4)(C) appears to directly contradict an application of the Calero-Toledo dicta as the proper
standard under that section. While the statutory "willful blindness" language would seem to require an owner to take affirmative preventive
steps only if she has some reason to suspect that her vehicle would be
used illegally, the Calero-Toledo standard places an affirmative duty on
an owner to take "reasonable precautions" to prevent the proscribed use
of her property no matter what her state of knowledge. This contradiction
would suggest that the use of the Calero-Toledo standard as controlling
on the status of "innocent owners" under section 881(a)(4)(C) is
misplaced.
50. Id. at 888. Catero-Toledo requires that a claimant prove "not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, [upon which forfeiture is sought] but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the [activity] ......
416 U.S. at 663, 689.
51. Id. (citing United States v. One 1982 28' International Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319 (11th
Cir. 1984)).
52. For those wishing to claim innocent owner status, the requirements of Calero-Toledo
are most unforgiving. See infra text accompanying note 111,
53. United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911 Vin 9117201924, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 1185
(W.D. Tex. 1990).
54. Id. at 1185.
55. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 157, 159 (2d ed. 1961).
56.

Adams, supra note 5, at

-

n.36.
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If the Eleventh Circuit is going to use the Calero-Toledo dicta as the
applicable standard governing innocent ownership under section
881(a)(4)(C), it should reinterpret that dicta to require an affirmative
duty to investigate only if the owner has reason to suspect that another
person has used her vehicle for illegal purposes. Several reasons support
this proposition.
First, while the Calero-Toledo dicta represents the minimum protection offered to "innocent owners" under the Constitution,' 7 Congress has
the ability to provide more protection to individuals if it so chooses." As
several courts recognize, in enacting the "innocent owner" statutory defenses Congress could have incorporated the Calero-Toledo language directly into the statute. 59 The fact that Congress did not use the CaleroToledo language in section 881(a)(4)(C) raises the inference that it sought
to provide more protection to "innocent owners" than the Constitutional
minimum, especially when the statute uses language that carries its own
connotations within the criminal context. Thus, when Congress has chosen to enact statutory "innocent owner" defenses that differ in language
from the dicta describing the basic constitutional protection, one must
accord such defenses their own independent weight. Otherwise, since
courts were already using the dicta to protect owners from forfeiture, the
new statutory provision would merely be superfluous.60
Second, prior to the enactment of section 881(a)(4)(C), some courts in
personal property cases had already interpreted the Calero-Toledo dicta,
despite its literal language, to require the owner to take affirmative action
only when he had reason to suspect the conveyance might be used illegally.61 Likewise, courts had denied "innocent owner" status to claimants
because circumstances had established actual or constructive knowledge
of the possibility of illegal use of their conveyance.' 2 This interpretation
of the Calero-Toledo dicta, while not in accord with the absolute affirma57. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-690 (1974).
58. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 349-50 (2d ed. 1988).
59. See United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United
States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 915 n.15 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (relating to the
incorporation of dicta into section 881(a)(7)).
60. See Alice Marie O'Brien, Note, "Caught in the Crossfire": Protecting the Innocent
Owner of Real Property From Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 521, 546 (1991).
61. See United States v. One Datsun 280ZX, 644 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D. Pa' 1986);
United States v. One Mercury Cougar XR-7, 397 F. Supp. 1325, 1327 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
62. See United States v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft, 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. One Mercedes Benz, 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985). For a fuller discussion, see Patricia M. Canavan, Note, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property: The Government's Weapon Against Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10 PACE L. REV. 485, 501-03 (1990).
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tive duty required by its literal language, is more in accord with the definition of willful blindness as understood in the context of criminal law.
Given Congress' use of the term "willful blindness" in section
881(a)(4)(C), interpreting Calero-Toledo to require an owner to take
"reasonable precautions" only when he has some reason to suspect an illegal use of his conveyance would more nearly accord with Congress'
probable intention in using that term.
Finally, when Congress enacted section 881(a)(4)(C) it broadened the
already existing but limited statutory "innocent owner" defense of section
881(a)(4)(B). 63 Certainly, the Calero-Toledo standard would have filled
the gap in protection given innocent owners by section 881(a)(4)(B), even
without the statutory provision of section 881(a)(4)(C). However, interpreting section 881(a)(4)(C) to incorporate the literal requirements of the
Calero-Toledo standard would not increase the protection offered owners
and thereby further the remedial purposes of the statute, but would instead penalize owners by placing on them an affirmative duty to investigate no matter what the circumstances. 4 By reading section 881(a)(4)(C)
and the incorporated Calero-Toledo dicta to require an owner to take affirmative steps only when he has reason to suspect the conveyance may
be used for illegal drug transactions, courts will more effectively balance
both the deterrent and remedial purposes contained in the civil forfeiture
statute.
B. 21 U.S.C. §.881(a)(6),(7)
Section 881(a)(6), the proceeds provision of the civil forfeiture statute,
authorizes forfeiture of anything furnished or intended to be furnished in
exchange for controlled substances or the proceeds traceable to such an
exchange. e5 Section 881(a)(7), the real property provision of the civil forfeiture statute, authorizes the forfeiture of any interest in all real property and appurtenances used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate a felony narcotics violation."e Both sections contain identical
"innocent owner provisions" despite being enacted at different times."
Under either of these sections, a claimant can succeed on a defense of
"innocent ownership" only if he can establish that the act giving rise to
forfeiture was committed or omitted "without his knowledge or con63. See supra note 18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limitation of section
881 (a)(4)(B).
64. See Jankowski, supra note 10, at 193 (noting that courts have consistently misapplied the Calero-Toledo dicta to make it a punitive rather than a protective measure as was
intended by the Supreme Court).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (1988).

66. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 31-42.
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sent."as Courts have interpreted the phrase "without his knowledge or
consent" in three distinct ways." Some courts have interpreted the
phrase disjunctively.70 Others have interpreted it conjunctively." A third
set of courts has interpreted the phrase by incorporating the Calero-Toledo dicta into it.' s
A disjunctive interpretation of the phrase "without the knowledge or
consent of the owner" allows an owner to avoid forfeiture under section
881(a)(6) or (7) if he can establish that he did not consent to the illegal
activity giving rise to forfeiture even though he had knowledge of it."3
Conversely, under a conjunctive interpretation in which the word "or"
would be read as the word "and," a claimant can establish his innocence
only by establishing both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to the
illegal activity giving rise to forfeiture.' 4 Arguments for and against each
interpretation hinge on statutory canons and policy considerations.
Courts adopting the disjunctive approach rely on the canon of construction that the court must give effect, if possible, to every word in the
statute." This approach reaches its conclusion through the following reasoning. ' Under a conjunctive interpretation, a claimant would have to
68. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6),(7) (1988).
69. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 529-48; Brad A. Chapman & Kenneth W. Pearson,
Comment, The Drug War and Real Estate Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881: The '"nnocent" Lienholder's Rights, 21 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 2127, 2177 (1990).
70. See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir.
1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d
396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Real Property Known As 19026 Oakmont S. Drive, 715 F. Supp. 233, 237
n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1989); United States v. 60 Acres, More or Less With Improvements, Located
in Etowah County, Ala., 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1418-19 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Lot Ill-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. 124 East N.
Ave., 651 F. Supp. 1350, 1357 (N.D. 11. 1987); United States v. Four Million Two Hundred
Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986);
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate at 5745 N.W. 110th Street, Miami, Fla., 721 F.
Supp. 287, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Premises Described as Route 2, Box 61-C, Crosset, Ark.,
727 F. Supp. 1295,. 1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990); United States v. Real Property Located at 2011
Calumet, Houston, Tex., 699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988); United States v. One Single
Family Residence Located at 2901 S.W. 118th Court, Miami, Fla., 683 F. Supp. 783, 788
(S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Two Tracts of Real 'Property Containing 30.80 Acres, 665
F. Supp. 422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd sub nor, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
73. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 529-30.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property & Premises Known As 171-02 Liberty Ave.,
710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955)).
76. See United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990); Loomba,
supra note 17, at 485.
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prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to the illegal activity to prevail as an "innocent owner."' "7 Knowledge of an activity, however, is a prerequisite to consent to that activity. One could never prove
lack of consent without first having admitted knowledge. A conjunctive
interpretation then effectively renders the consent defense illusory. Instead, under a conjunctive interpretation, the phrase "without knowledge
or consent" would truly only mean "without knowledge." The word consent would be mere surplusage. Conversely, a disjunctive interpretation of
the phrase "without knowledge or consent" would give effect to the word
consent, by allowing an owner to establish his innocence by proving that
he did not consent to an activity even though he had knowledge of it."
Despite this analysis, certain courts that considered the issue refused to
accept the disjunctive approach. Some courts have based this decision
solely on policy grounds.7

Courts and commentators disagree over whether policy considerations
favor a conjunctive or a disjunctive approach.80 Some reject the disjunctive approach because it could allow an owner to know of and tacitly condone illegal drug activity but still claim that he did not consent to the
activity.81 Other courts and commentators feel that owners who know
that their property is being used for illegal activity, but have taken af77. Loomba, supra note 17, at 485.
78. See supra text accompanying note 73. At least one commentator has criticized the
reliance on the use of statutory canons to determine the meaning of the "without knowledge
or consent" language. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 536-37 (noting that use of canons alone
may not provide the in-depth thoughtful analysis needed to provide a sound basis for future
decisions). Another commentator has noted that the logical principle known as De Morgan's
theorem would call for a conjunctive approach. As yet, however, seemingly no court has used
De Morgan's theorem to interpret a statute. See Loomba, supra note 17, at 481 n.68.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Known as 890 Noyac
Road, Noyac, N.Y., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Land Known as Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
80. Compare United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Known as 890 Noyac
Road, Noyac, N.Y., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir.
1991); Chapman & Pearson, supra note 69, at 192-93 (policy favors conjunctive approach)
with-United States v.141st Street Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991); Loomba, supra note 17, at 486 (policy favors disjunctive
approach).
.81. See United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Known as 890 Noyac Road,
Noyac, N.Y., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991)
(fearing disjunctive approach would lead to "absurd results"); United States v. One Parcel
of Land, Known as 'Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (governmental policy of
making forfeiture a powerful weapon against drugs would be "substantially undercut if persons who were fully aware of the illegal connection or source of their property were permitted to reclaim the property as 'innocent' owners").
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firmative steps to prevent that use are unfairly denied "innocent owner"

status by a conjunctive interpretation of the statute."s
All considerations of the applicability of the Calero-Toledo standard to
the interpretation of section 881(a)(6) and (7)'s "innocent owner" provisions aside, it seems apparent that policy considerations favor courts in-

terpreting the statute disjunctively. A disjunctive interpretation would allow more owners who are truly "innocent" to save their property from

forfeiture than a conjunctive interpretation, a result seemingly in accordance with congressional recognition of the need to temper the harsh results of forfeiture. More importantly, the fear that an owner who tacitly
condones illegal activity on his property could retain it under a disjunctive interpretation of the statute seems overblown for two reasons. First,
the burden is on the claimant to establish his "innocent" status; it is not
on the government to disprove such status.83 Second, a court adopting a
disjunctive interpretation will have considerable leeway to determine on a
fact sensitive, case-by-case basis what constitutes a lack of consent within
the meaning of the statute.84 Given this judicial leeway, a disjunctive interpretation seems to provide a better balance between both the deterrent
and remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute.
A third group of courts outside the Eleventh Circuit, interpreting the
"innocent owner" provisions of section 881(a)(6) and (7), have required
claimants to meet the Calero-Toledo standard in order to establish "innocent owner" status."s The courts' opinions, however, usually provide no
rationale for the application of the Calero-Toledo standard to these statutory provisions.8 6 Instead, as authority for this application, the courts,

82. See United States v. 141st Street Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991) (claiming congressional intent was to protect "innocent
owners" from harsh result of forfeiture).
83. See United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, Known as the MA' Mologs, 876 F.2d 884, 888 (11th Cir. 1989).
84. See, e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 879 (1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991) (concluding proof of lack of consent requires claimant to
prove "that he did all he reasonably could to prevent the illegal activity once he learned of
it."); United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less With Improvements, Located in Etowah
County, Ala., 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1420-22 (1990) (noting difficulty of drawing line between
doing all that one reasonably could to prevent the illegal activity and at least doing something to prevent it).
85. See cases cited supra note 72.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, Houston, Tex.,
699 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Tex. 1988); United States v. Premises Described as Route 2, Box
61-C, Crosset, Ark., 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D. Ark.*1990). The court in Crosset claimed
that the Supreme Court had little sympathy for lessors losing their property. 727 F. Supp.
at 1299 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974)).
But see United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property, Containing 30.80 Acres, 655 F. Supp.
422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987), af/'d sub nom, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that innocent
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perhaps confusedly, cite cases that were decided when there were no statutory "innocent owner" provisions."7 Given those citations and the scarcity of courts adhering to such an interpretation of section 881(a)(6) and
(7)'s "innocent owner" provisions, it is tempting to say that those decisions are mere aberrations. The Eleventh Circuit, however, has recently
held the Calero-Toledo dicta applicable to section 881(a)(6)
proceedings."
Until mid-1991, the seminal case in the Eleventh Circuit interpreting
the "without knowledge or consent" language of section 881(a)(6) was
United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand." In
that case the court of appeals held that the "innocent owner" provision of
section 881(a)(6) turned "on the claimant's actual knowledge" 0 and left
it to another day to decide if the Calero-Toledo dicta applied to actions
under section 881(a)(6).91 Most of the subsequent decisions by courts in,
the Eleventh Circuit have cited Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five
Thousand as authority for rejecting the incorporation of the Calero-Toledo dicta into section 881(a)(6) or (7)92 or have followed that court's example and avoided a decision on the issue."
District courts rejecting the application of the Calero-Toledo standard
to the statutory "innocent owner" provision of section 881(a)(7) have relied on three basic arguments to support their position.94 First, the courts
owner defense of section 881(a)(7) fully comports with the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Calero-Toledo).
87. See, e.g., Real Property Located at 2011 Calumet, Houston, Tex., 699 F. Supp. at
110; Premises Described as Route 2, Box 61-C, Crosset, Ark., 727 F. Supp. at 1299. Both
courts cited pre-1988 section 881(a)(4) cases as authority.
88. See United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave.
North, Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla., 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991). For a discussion
of that case and its possible ramifications, see infra text accompanying notes 104-22.
89. 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985).
90. Id. at 906. Like other courts at this time, the court of appeals was following a conjunctive interpretation of the "without knowledge or consent" language of section
881(a)(6)'s "innocent owner" provision. The issue of whether the language should be interpreted disjunctively would not arise until 1989 with United States v. Certain Real Property
& Premises Known as 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
91. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F. Supp. at 906 n.24.
92. See United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989);.
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Consisting of Approximately 4,657 Acres, Located in Martin County, Fla., 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
93. See United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 6960 Miraflores Ave.,
Coral Gables, Fla., 731 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 n.14 (S.D. Fla. 1990). But see United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate at 5745 N.W. 110 Street, Miami, Fla., 721 F. Supp. 287, 290
(1989) (finding actual knowledge on part of claimant and avoiding decision on applicability
of Calero-Toledo dicta to section 881(a)(7) in light of a section 881(a)(4)(C) case).
94. The leading case rejecting Calero-Toledo in the Eleventh Circuit is United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate Consisting of Approximately 4,657 Acres, Located in Martin
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held Calero-Toledo inapplicable to section 881(a)(6) or (7) because that
case did not involve an express statutory "innocent owner" provision and
therefore should not control the interpretation of cases that are brought
under such statutory "innocent owner" provisions." Second, the courts
reasoned that "[i]f the legislature intended to incorporate the 'reasonable
standard' defense of Calero-Toledo into Section 881(a)(7), they could
have done it considering Section 881(a)(7) was enacted ten years after the
Calero-Toledo decision."' Finally, those courts argue that governmental
policy disfavors forfeiture and intends it as a penalty only on those who
are "significantly involved in a criminal enterprise."" Thus, an interpretation of the statute incorporating Calero-Toledo's strict requirements,
instead of allowing a claimant to succeed on lack of knowledge alone,
would be "inconsistent with the policy behind the forfeiture statutes."'
Despite these cases rejecting the incorporation of the Calero-Toledo
dicta into section 881(a)(6) and (7)'s statutory "innocent owner" provisions, courts in two other decisions have held the Calero-Toledo dicta applicable to section 881(a)(6).9
County, Fla., 730 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The reasoning in this case was followed by
the court in United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914-916 (S.D. Fla.
1989). The other case rejecting the application of Calero-Toledo to section 881(a)(7) relied
on the same basic argument as the 4,657 Acre court, and cited this as the majority view. See
United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at Rt. 1, Box 137, Randolph, Chilton
County, Ala., 743 F. Supp. 802, 806 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
95. One Parcel of Real Estate Consisting of Approximately 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at
427. Accord One Parcel of Property Located at Rt. 1, Box 137, 743 F. Supp. at 806.
96. One Parcel of Real Estate Consisting of Approximately 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at
427. This argument would apply equally well to section 881(a)(6) which was enacted four
years after Calero-Toledo. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
The court in 4,657 Acres Also attempted to back up this argument by-claiming that Congress did explicitly provide for the "reasonable standard" of Calero-Toledo when it enacted
881(a)(4)(C), while at 'the same time it refused to enact this "reasonable standard" into
section 881(a)(7). This argument is weak for two, reasons. First, it is questionable whether
the "without knowledge, consent, or willful blindness" language of section 881(a)(4)(C) can
be equated with the Calero-Toledo standard. See supra text accompanying notes 47-64 for a
discussion of what constitutes innocence under section 881(a)(4)(C). Second, the court was
mistaken when it stated that section 881(a)(4)(C) was enacted during the same time as section 881(a)(7). While section 881(a)(7) was enacted in 1984, section 881(a)(4)(C) was not
enacted until 1988. For a discussion of the historical development of the various statutory
"innocent owner" provisions see supra text accompanying notes 31-46.
97. 730 F. Supp. at 427-28.
98. Id.
99. See United States v. One Single.Family Residence Located at 2901 S.W. 118th
Court, Miami, Fla., 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. One Single Family
Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave. North, Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla., 933 F.2d
976 (11th Cir. 1991).
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In United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 2901

S.W. 118th Court, Miami, Fla.,100 a district court held that a claimant
must meet the Calero-Toledo requirements in order to succeed on section
881(a)(6)'s "innocent owner" defense. 01 The court did not give a rationale for this decision, but merely cited the deferral of the question by the
0 and consecourt in Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand"'
quently concluded that the Calero-Toledo standard applied. 08
The most important decision regarding the applicability of the CaleroToledo dicta to the statutory "innocent owner" provisions of section
881(a)(6) and (7) is United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave., North, Lake Park, Palm Beach County, Fla.' 4
In that case, a claimant had invested legitimate funds in the purchase of
real estate with the knowledge that his co-investor's funds were the proceeds of drug transactions. The court held that when a claimant "ha[d]
actual knowledge that ... legitimate funds [we]re commingled with drug
proceeds, traceable in accord with the forfeiture statute, the legitimate
funds [we]re subject to forfeiture."'0 8 Citing its own deferral of the question of whether the Calero-Toledo dicta was applicable to forfeiture actions under section 881(a)(6),10 the court then stated "[w]e now hold that
the "reasonably possible language of Calero-Toledo applies to section
881(a)(6) proceedings." 10 7 On its face, this language suggests that claimants in the Eleventh Circuit would have to meet the literal requirements
set forth in the Calero-Toledo dicta'08 in order to succeed on a defense
under the "innocent owner" provision of section 881(a)(6), and by extension under section 881(a)(7). On closer inspection, however, that conclusion proves erroneous.
Courts have construed the application of the Calero-Toledo dicta to the
statutory "innocent owner" provisions of section 881(a)(6) and (7) in two
different ways.'0 9 The majority of courts that have applied the Calero100. 683 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
101. Id. at 788. The court found that the claimant, a bail bonding company, had not
done everything reasonably possible to inform itself that the collateral it had taken as security was proceeds of a drug transaction, especially when it was present at the bond hearing
where evidence was presented that cocaine was found in the house. Id. at 788-89.
102. 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985).
103. 683 F. Supp. at 788.
104. 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991).
105. Id. at 982 (citing its decision in United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred FiftyFive Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 n.24 (11th Cir. 1985)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See infra text accompanying note 111 for a description of the literal requirements
of the Calero-Toledo dicta.
109. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 544-45.
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-Toledo dicta to the "innocent owner" provisions of sections 881(a)(6) and
(7) have in effect substituted the Calero-Toledo requirements as the standard for prevailing on the statutory defense of innocent ownership. 110
Under this substitutionary view, to succeed on a statutory defense of innocent ownership, a claimant would have to prove three elements: (1)
that he was unaware of the illegal activity, (2) that he was uninvolved in
that activity;, and (3) that he did all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property."' Because all three requirements must be met before a claimant can succeed on his defense, this
approach is, in effect, a conjunctive interpretation of the statute."2
The second approach, however, requires a court to have decided first on
a disjunctive interpretation to the statutory phrase "without knowledge
or consent."' 13 Under this approach, first adopted in United States v.
141st Street Corp. By Hersh,"" the only requirement incorporated into
the statute is the third Calero-Toledo requirement that a claimant has
done "all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use
of his property."1 The court uses that requirement to define what constitutes a lack of consent under the statute." 6 Thus, unaer this application of the Calero-Toledo dicta, a claimant can succeed on a statutory
defense of "innocent ownership" even though he has knowledge of illegal
activity if he can "prove that he did all that reasonably 7could be expected
to prevent the illegal activity once he learned of it.""1

Which view, then, did the court of appeals adhere to in One Single
Family Residence Located at 15603 85th Ave. North' s when it stated
"we now hold that the 'reasonably possible'- language of Calero-Toledo
110. See, e.g., United States v. Two Tracts of Real Property Containing 30.80 Acres, 665
F. Supp. 422, 425 (M.D.N.C. 1987), afj'd sub nom, 856 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1988).
111. See United States v. Premises Described As Route 2, Box 61-C, Crosset, Ark., 727
F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (tracking language of Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974)).
112. See O'Brien, supra note 60, at 544-45 (stating that the Calero-Toledo dicta under
this approach is merely another element of knowledge which must be established to succeed
on the innocent owner defense).
113. See United States v. 141st Street Corp. By Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 878-79 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (i991).
114. 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1017 (1991).
115. 911 F.2d at 878-89.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Second Circuit has affirmed this approach in two cases subsequent to 141st
Street Corp. By Hersh. See United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Known as
890 Noyac Road, Noyac, N.Y., 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Certain Real
Property & Premises, Known as 418 57th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y., 922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir.
1990).
118. 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1990).
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applies to section 881(a)(6) proceedings"?" 9 Arguably, since the court
was deciding the applicability of the Calero-Toledo dicta to section
881(a)(6)'s "innocent owner" provision, the court meant its holding to refer to the literal requirements of Calero-Toledo.However, the language of
the court's holding refers only to the "reasonably possible" requirement,
not to all three Calero-Toledo requirements as the court might have used
if it were adopting the "substitutionary" approach.
More importantly, it is clear that the court meant to require a disjunctive interpretation in its application of the Calero-Toledo "reasonably
possible" standard to section 881(a)(6)'s innocent owner "without knowledge or consent" language. The court said that "in applying this rule, a
claimant who has actual knowledge of the commingling of legitimate and
drug funds may be spared forfeiture as an innocent owner if the claimant
can prove that everything reasonably possible was done to withdraw the
commingled funds or to dispose of the property. 1 2 0 The court reinforced
citation to 141st Street Corp. By
its adoption of this approach by its
12 1
Hersh as support for that language.
Because the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the approach of the court in
141st Street Corp. By Hersh with regard to section 881(a)(6) proceedings,
it is likely that district courts will also adopt that approach in section
881(a)(7) proceedings. 1 2 Because this approach best balances the deterrent and remedial purposes of Congress in enacting the civil forfeiture
provisions of section 881(a)(6) and (7), it is likely that other circuits will
soon be considering whether to follow suit.
III.

CONCLUSION

In deciding what constitutes "innocence" within the meaning of the
"innocent owner" provisions of the civil drug forfeiture statute, courts are
forced to confront questions of statutory interpretation, congressional intention and purpose, the applicability of Supreme Court dicta, and prior
precedent. Obviously, there are no easy answers to these questions. Further, given the newness of section 881(a)(4)(C) and the likelihood that
119. Id. at 982.
120. Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, under the conjunctive approaches of the actual
knowledge standard or the literal Calero-Toledo requirements, the claimant's having actual
knowledge alone would have defeated his claim of "innocence."
121. Id.
122. No apparent reason exists why such an approach will not be adopted given the
identical "innocent owner" language of sections 881(a)(6) and (7), especially since 141st
Street Corp. involved section 881(a)(7). For a recognition of the potential applicability of
this approach to section 881(a)(7) in the Eleventh Circuit based on the court of appeals
recent decision, see United States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 15526 69th
Drive N., Lake Park, Fla., 778 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
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courts will increasingly have to choose between the various competing approaches to the interpretation of section 881(a)(6) and (7)'s "innocent
owner" provisions, this area of the law will probably remain unsettled for
some time to come.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' adoption of the 141st Street
Corp by Hersh approach to interpreting the innocent owner provision of
section 881(a)(6) seems immensely satisfying. Under either the regular
conjunctive interpretation of that provision or the conjunctive interpretation that substitutes the Calero-Toledo standard for the statutory terms,
a claimant was denied access to any type of consent defense. The argument that Congress was not merely repeating itself when it enacted the
knowledge or consent language in section 881(a)(6) and, that to give it
effect, a court should adopt a disjunctive interpretation of that language
proves itself acceptable through application. The value of the specific disjunctive approach used in 141st Street Corp. By Hersh and adopted by
the Eleventh Circuit lies in the guideline it provides in defining what constitutes a lack of consent under the statute. With the third Calero-Toledo
requirement as a definitional guideline, case law will soon fashion precedents under which lenders, apartment owners, and others can structure
3
their conduct.
No such enthusiasm for the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of section
881(a)(4)(C)'s innocent owner provision exists. That provision allows an
owner to establish his innocent status by showing that the act giving rise
to forfeiture occurred without his knowledge, consent, or willful blindness. ' 4 The blind recitation of Calero-Toledo as the applicable standard
under this provision is simply poor jurisprudence.2 1 In the case of a
claimant asserting his "innocence" under this statutory provision, the
question before the court is one of statutory interpretation. This interpretative process requires, at a minimum, that the court consider the meaning of the words of the statute as enacted by Congress.
That a court, reasonably construing the phrase "without knowledge,
consent or willful blindness," could in any way find that Congress intended that language to be a codification of the Calero-Toledo standard is
simply an unpersuasive argument.'2 That the court failed to consider the
statutory language is regrettable in and of itself, but is even more regret-

123. For an example of this process already in action, see the court's opinion in United
States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Known as 418 57th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y., 922
F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1990).
124. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52 for a discussion of the court's decision in
United States v. One 1980 58' Motor Yacht, Known as the M/V Mologa, 876 F.2d 884 (11th
Cir. 1989).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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table when its opinion is precedent setting for the entire circuit.1"' If a
court's persuasiveness is the foundation for its legitimacy, then the Eleventh Circuit has lost a great deal of that legitimacy on this issue. Because
of its erroneous reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit undoubtedly will eventually be forced to reconsider its position, and in all likelihood, to adopt the
better-reasoned interpretation of the statute offered by another circuit.
WILLIAM THOMPSON

127.

Id.

